A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for Mobile Sponsored Content
  and Service Markets by Wang, Wenbo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
11
26
4v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 29
 Ju
n 2
01
8
A Hierarchical Game with Strategy Evolution for
Mobile Sponsored Content and Service Markets
Wenbo Wang, Member, IEEE, Zehui Xiong, Student Member, IEEE, Dusit
Niyato, Fellow, IEEE, Ping Wang, Senior Member, IEEE and Zhu Han, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
In sponsored content and service markets, the content and service providers are able to subsidize their target
mobile users through directly paying the mobile network operator, to lower the price of the data/service access charged
by the network operator to the mobile users. The sponsoring mechanism leads to a surge in mobile data and service
demand, which in return compensates for the sponsoring cost and benefits the content/service providers. In this paper,
we study the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the mobile users, the content/service providers
and the network operator, as a two-level game with multiple Stackelberg (i.e., leader) players. Our study is featured by
the consideration of global network effects owning to consumers’ grouping. Since the mobile users may have bounded
rationality, we model the service-selection process among them as an evolutionary-population follower sub-game.
Meanwhile, we model the pricing-then-sponsoring process between the content/service providers and the network
operator as a non-cooperative equilibrium searching problem. By investigating the structure of the proposed game,
we reveal a few important properties regarding the equilibrium existence, and propose a distributed, projection-based
algorithm for iterative equilibrium searching. Simulation results validate the convergence of the proposed algorithm,
and demonstrate how sponsoring helps improve both the providers’ profits and the users’ experience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent few years has witnessed a pervasive growth of the mobile data market at about 40% per
year [2], thanks to the explosion in the number of mobile applications and daily active Mobile Users (MUs).
In response to the market growth, the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are also upping the ante in their quest
for more customers. In 2014, AT&T collaborated with market portal companies like Aquto and launched a
billing platform to allow bill transfer from MUs to third-party Content and Service Providers (CSPs). Since
then, the sponsored content/service market has developed rapidly with more and more companies identifying
the business potential. For example, Singtel, with the sponsorships provided by the social media networks
(e.g., WeChat and Whatapp), has introduced the fixed-rate plans of unlimited Over-The-Top (OTT) service
usage in Singapore1. Verizon, in its competition with other ISPs, offers the FreeBee Data2, which allows
content providers such as AOL to subside part or all of their data through mobile apps without impacting
on users’ existing data allotments. With the ISP-CSP partnerships, this new market structure generates a
virtuous cycle [3]. First, the enhanced data access to the sponsored contents at lower rate encourages a
deeper user engagement with the CSPs. This leads to the beneficiary global network effect of the services
that the CSPs provide [4], especially when the engagement stimulates a higher user activity in the social
media networks. Second, the CSPs gain more profit from more active user subscriptions, which in return
compensates for the sponsorship cost. Third, the ISPs, as content/service distributors, are able to distinguish
themselves with featured services in the market competition, and thus obtain more revenue with a larger
user population (Figure 1). Intuitively, such a market mechanism promises a win-win situation for all the
three parties. However, the complexity of analyzing the interactions among the market entities becomes a
significant challenge, especially when the market entities seek optimal market strategies non-cooperatively.
In facing such a challenge, we investigate the interactions among the three parties in the sponsored
content and service market with the presence of significant global network effects. In this paper, we study a
transparent market with a single ISP, i.e., a Mobile Network Operator (MNO), a group of (heterogeneous)
CSPs and a large population of MUs. In particular, we focus on the strategy evolution in the population of
the MUs and the dynamics of the CSPs’ sponsorship provision in the framework of a hierarchical market,
where both global network effects and the congestion effect are experienced by the MUs. In the considered
hierarchical market, the MNO and the CSPs naturally take the lead to determine the rates of content/service
subscriptions and the sponsorship levels. Then, the MUs follow to choose which CSP to subscribe to with
1https://sg.news.yahoo.com/wechat-active-discussions-singtel-020012232.html.
2https://www.internetservices.verizon.com/mis/freebeeperks/overview/.
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Fig. 1. A schematic example of the sponsored service markets, where all the payments are made to the network operator.
bounded rationality. For such a mobile service market, we propose to model the interactions among the
market entities as a two-level hierarchical game. The main contributions of this paper include:
1) We model the evolution of the sponsored service market as a two-level hierarchical game. On the user
(i.e., follower) level, the dynamics of CSP subscriptions by the MUs is formulated as an evolutionary
sub-game with the MUs adopting the pairwise proportional imitation protocol. On the provider (i.e.,
leader) level, the interaction between the MNO and the CSPs is formulated as a non-cooperative game.
2) For the formulated follower sub-game, we investigate the impact of both the congestion and the positive
network externalities on the MUs’ payoff. We consider the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) as
the solutions of the evolutionary sub-game and investigate the existence and the uniqueness condition
for the ESS. Statistically speaking, the proposed evolutionary-game model is especially appropriate for
describing the subscription process among a massive population of MUs without full rationality.
3) We provide a series of theoretical analyses on the equilibrium properties in the sponsored content and
service market. We cast the equilibrium searching problem into a bi-level programming problem and
propose a hierarchical strategy updating mechanism. The proposed decentralized equilibrium searching
algorithms constitute an incentive-compatible strategy-updating protocol for the three parties in the
market, and guarantee the convergence to the Nash Equilibrium (NE).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the related work.
In Section III, we present the model of the sponsored content/service market and propose a hierarchical
game-based formulation of the interactions among the three parties therein. In Section IV, we model the
user-level sub-game as an evolutionary game and investigate the property of evolutionary dynamics in the
CSP-selection process. Further, we model the optimal-pricing mechanism among the providers as a bi-
level programming problem, and reveal the condition for the existence of both the NE and the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) in the market. In Section V, we propose a distributed projection-based updating scheme of
equilibrium searching and provide a practical condition that guarantees its convergence. Section VI presents
the simulation results and detailed analysis for the network performance. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the past few years, a line of studies have attempted to provide insight into the dynamics of sponsored
content and service markets from different perspectives. In [5], a three-stage optimization hierarchy was
proposed to model the process of selecting content volume, sponsorship levels and unit data price by the
MUs, the CSPs and the monopolistic ISP in a pay-as-you-go market. Therein, the CSPs’ revenue obtained
from ad-clicking was assumed to be proportional to the consumed content volume, and the MUs were
allowed to consume contents from different CSPs at the same time. A similar decision hierarchy was
considered in [6], where the study was limited to a market with one large CSP and one small CSP in
terms of their revenue levels. The competitions between the CPSs in two situations, namely, with fixed user
number for the CSPs (short-run) and with flexible user number for the CSPs (long-run), were analyzed.
The authors of [6] further expanded their study in [7] to a more general situation with multiple CSPs.
In [7], a two-stage Stackelberg framework was introduced to capture the interactions between the CSPs
and the ISP under a known quality of service level required by the MUs. The CSPs decided on whether
to sponsor the MUs or not according to the aggregated traffic demand and the ISP’s delivery capacity.
It is worth noting that many existing studies have adopted similar mathematical models that are able to
reflect the decision hierarchy in the markets (e.g., Stackelberg games [7]–[9] and auctions [10]), mainly
owning to the “price-then-respond” property of the market structure. However, in the existing studies, the
proposed market models are generally subject to non-scalable MU numbers. Meanwhile, the considered
payoff/revenue models are usually limited to describing the specific scenarios where the CSPs rely on
advertisements for sponsorship compensation [5]–[9].
Apart from the interaction among the three parties that displays strong characteristics of hierarchy, the
sponsored service market is also characterized by the significant demand-side effects, also known as the
network effects. Generally, the network effect indicates that the public goods are more valuable to consumers
as the number of their consumers increases [11]. If the external benefits with the inclusion of new consumers
are the same for all the current consumers, we call it the global network effect. Identified as a predominant
characteristic of information economies [12], network effects plays a significant role in the operations of
Internet service markets. The global network effect can be widely observed in social service platforms, e.g.,
with value-added service providers such as WeChat and C2C e-commerce providers such as Ebay. Due to
the user grouping effect, a user’s involvement with a social service will result in positive network effects on
the other users (e.g., its social friends). For both the MNO and the CSPs, how to attract the next “marginal”
user has always been among the most important consideration. For the MUs, service sponsoring allows for
better differentiation of services, which in return may greatly enhance their own utilities due to the positive
network externalities. In the literature, the most relevant network-effect model to that of this paper can be
found in [13], where both the network effect and the congestion effect are jointly modeled by a quadratic
payoff function, and a two-stage Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the interaction between two
parties, namely, the MUs and a single wireless provider. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the
study on the impact of network effects on a scalable sponsored content/service market still remains an open
issue, which becomes the exact motivation for our research.
III. NETWORK MODEL: A HIERARCHICAL GAME INTERPRETATION
A. System model
We consider a sponsored content/service market as in Figure 1, where a large population of N MUs are
offered similar but non-compatible mobile social services (e.g., OTT services such as messaging apps) by
M competing CSPs. The CSPs rely on the infrastructure (e.g., content delivery servers and backhaul-to-end
bandwidth) provided by the monopolistic MNO for service/content delivery. The MNO offers a flat-rate
subscription plan to the MUs for unlimited monthly service/data access to each CSP. Each CSP decides
on the sponsorship level offered to its customers. Meanwhile, to maximize its profit, the CSP chooses the
subsidy level for its customers and a bundle of delivery service to purchase from the MNO. Constrained
by the limited budget, an MU independently choose to subscribe to one of the CSPs given the Quality of
Experience (QoE) associated with the CSP and the subscription cost after discounting the subsidies.
We note that in practical scenarios, the data price charged by the ISP to the CSPs is usually low3.
Therefore, value-added social network service providers are more sensitive to the quality of connectivity
(i.e., throughput) since the revenue is made based on relatively little traffic [14]. We suppose that the CSPs
acquire from the MNO a capped bundle of content-delivery bandwidth and fairly distribute the available
bandwidth to their users. Then, we consider that a social network user (i.e., an MU) perceives the QoE of a
service based on two factors: the experienced delivery bandwidth, i.e., the internal network effect, and the
social gains that it enjoys from the social popularity of the subscribed service, i.e., the global network effect.
3According to [14], the current charge by ISPs for Content Delivery Network (CDN) services is as low as $0.01 to $0.02 per GB, and
compared with the whole volume of world Internet traffic, the cost of data volume for the CSPs is very small.
Generally, for a pair of the one-time, flat-rate subscription price pu and the sponsorship level θj ∈ [0, 1]
offered by CSP j, an MU’s payoff of choosing CSP j can be defined as:
πuj = γj,1u1(nj , bj) + γj,2u2(nj)− (1− θj)pu, (1)
where nj is the number of MUs subscribing to CSP j and bj is the CDN bandwidth acquired by CSP j
from the MNO. In (1), the first term, γj,1u1(nj , bj) is the delivery bandwidth-related QoE function, where
u1(nj , bj) is the user’s satisfaction level and γj,1 > 0 is the QoE-sensitivity coefficient. The second term,
γj,2u2(nj) is the extrinsic benefit of an MU owing to the global network effect. u2(nj) represents the social
benefits due to the global network effect and γj,2 > 0 is the network-effect sensitivity coefficient.
Since the CDN bandwidth bj is fairly distributed among the nj subscribers, the QoE function u1(nj, bj)
displays the global congestion effect. Namely, for the same amount of CDN bandwidth, an increasing
number of subscriptions degenerates each MU’s experience of the social network service (e.g., due to
longer delay). Then, the user-perceived QoE of the service provided by CSP j, u1(nj , bj) is expected to
satisfy the conditions of
∂u1(nj ,bj)
∂bj
> 0,
∂u1(nj ,bj)
∂nj
< 0 and u1(nj = 0, bj) = 0. Meanwhile, we assume that
the users’ perception of the social benefit of a service is homogeneous and positively driven by the size of
the social network [11]. Compared with the congestion effect u1(nj , bj), the global network effect u2(nj) is
usually modeled as a monotonically increasing function of nj with decreasing marginal satisfaction (cf., [6],
[15]). Namely, u2(nj) is expected to satisfy the conditions of
∂u2(nj)
∂nj
> 0,
∂2u2(nj)
∂n2j
< 0 and u2(nj = 0) = 0.
An exemplary realization of u1(nj , bj) can be constructed following [16] as:
u1(nj , bj) =


log
(
bj
oj + nj
)
, if nj > 0,
0, if nj = 0,
(2)
where oj ≥ 1 is a constant representing the maintenance overhead, and u1(nj) is piecewise continuous.
Similarly, a typical realization of u2(nj) can be constructed as follows:
u2(nj) = log(1 + nj), (3)
On the providers’ side, a CSP j (1≤ j ≤M) aims to maximize its profit by choosing the sponsorship
level θj ∈ [0, 1] as well as negotiating with the MNO about the provision of CDN bandwidth bj (bj ≥ 0).
Here, the payment for CDN bandwidth is usually determined by the premium peering agreement between
the MNO and each CSP [17]. The CSP evaluates its profit on the basis of active-user worth, while having to
pay the CDN bandwidth price and the user subsidies. Let uCSPj (nj) denote the total user worth. We consider
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the hierarchical game framework for the sponsored service market.
that uCSPj (nj) also possesses the property of decreasing marginal return, namely
∂uCSPj (nj)
∂nj
> 0,
∂2uCSPj (nj)
∂n2j
< 0
and uCSPj (nj = 0) = 0. Then, CSP j’s utility is:
πcj = u
CSP
j (nj)− puθjnj − pcbj , (4)
where pc is the contract price for CDN bandwidth bj , and we consider that each CSP has a budget limit
on the total spendings as puθjnj + pcbj ≤ cj . A typical realization of uCSPj (nj) can be adopted based on the
logarithmic model (cf. [15]):
uCSPj (nj) = σj log(1 + nj), (5)
where σj is the coefficient for the monetary worth of the total active subscriptions for CSP j.
Further, we consider that the MNO applies a uniform price pu for each user’s subscription and an
indiscriminative price pc for bandwidth provision to the CSPs. Then, the MNO’s revenue is:
πo = pc
M∑
j=1
bj + pu
M∑
j=1
nj , (6)
where we assume that the highest prices are limited by the regulator authority as 0≤pu≤pu and 0≤pc≤pc.
B. Hierarchical Game Formulation
Considering the utility functions given in (1)-(6), it is natural to cast the market dynamics described in
Section III-A into two stages. In the first stage, the MNO and the CSPs negotiate over the prices pc, pu and
the bandwidth bj , and then each CSP j (1 ≤j≤M) chooses the sponsorship level θj in a non-cooperative
manner. In the second stage, each MU independently selects one CSP to subscribe to, based on the QoE
and the subscription payments associated with the CSPs. Then, we can model the sponsored service market
as a two-stage, multi-leader-multi-follower hierarchical game as in Figure 2. Mathematically, the two-stage
hierarchical game can be described in the way of backward induction as follows:
1) User-level evolutionary sub-game: Let a0 = (pu, pc) denote the MNO’s pricing strategy and aj =
(θj , bj) denote the strategy of CSP j (1 ≤ j ≤ M). Given a fixed vector of joint providers’ strategy,
a = [a0, . . . , aM ]
⊤, the user-level (follower), evolutionary sub-game for CSP selection is defined by a
four-tuple: Gf =〈N ,M,x, [πuj (x, a)]
M
j=0〉, where
• N is the single population of active MUs with the cardinality |N | = N .
• M={0, 1, . . . ,M} is the set of strategies, where m=0 corresponds to the MUs’ action of subscribing
to no CSP and m 6=0 corresponds to the MUs’ action of subscribing to CSP m. |M| = 1 +M .
• x = [x0, x1, . . . , xM ]
⊤ is the vector of population states, where xj is the fraction of the MU pop-
ulation choosing CSP j (nj = xjN), and x is defined in the M-simplex X = {[x0, x1, . . . , xM ]⊤ ∈
R
M+1|
∑M
j=0 xj=1, xj≥0, ∀j}.
• [πuj (x, a)]
M
j=0 is the vector of MUs’ payoffs in the population state x. ∀j 6= 0, π
u
j (x, a) is given by (1)
with nj = xjN and π
u
0 (x, a) = 0.
Given a joint provider action a, we define the set of negative payoff for the population fractions as Ff (x, a)=[
−πuj (x, a)
]⊤
j∈M
. Then, from [18] the parametric NE of the user-level sub-game can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Follower Sub-game NE). Given the joint leader action a, an MU population state x∗(a) is
a sub-game NE if for all feasible state x the following inequality holds
(x− x∗(a))⊤ Ff(x
∗(a), a) ≥ 0. (7)
It is worth noting that the NE defined in (7) provides the condition for the equilibrium to be Nash
stationary, but not necessarily evolutionary stationary [19]. Then, it is necessary to check the stability of an
NE state for CSP selection. From Definition 1, suppose that there exists a population state x trying to invade
state x∗(a) by attracting a small share ǫ∈ (0, 1) of the MUs to switch to state x. Then, an Evolutionary
Stable State (ESS) can be defined as follows (cf. (4)-(6) in [19]):
Definition 2 (Follower Sub-game ESS). Given any invading population state x, x∗(a) is an ESS if there
exists a small ǫ∈(0, 1) such that ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ) the following condition holds∑
j∈M
x∗j (a)π
u
j ((1− ǫ)x
∗(a) + ǫx, a) ≥
∑
j∈M
xj(a)π
u
j ((1− ǫ)x
∗(a) + ǫx, a) . (8)
Equivalently, (7) is satisfied by all invading x and at the equality condition, the following holds
(x∗(a)− x)⊤ Ff(x, a) ≤ 0. (9)
2) Provider-level non-cooperative equilibrium searching problem: With an MUs’ population state x, the
non-cooperative equilibrium searching problem among the MNO and the CSPs can also be mathematically
described by a three-tuple Gl=〈K,A,π〉, where
• K={0, 1, . . . ,M} is the set of leaders, where k=0 represents the MNO and k 6=0 represents CSP k.
• A=×Mk=0Ak is the Cartesian product of the action spaces for player k ∈K, A0 = {(pu, pc)|0≤ pu≤
pu, 0≤pc≤pc} and Ak={(θk, bk)|∀k ∈ K\{0}, θk∈ [0, 1], puθkxkN+pcbk−ck ≤ 0}. Then, a∈A.
• π = [πo(a,x), πc1(a,x), . . . , π
c
M(a,x)]
⊤
is the vector of payoff functions. The MNO’s payoff π0 =
πo(a,x) is given by (6), and the CSP k’s payoff (k 6=0), πk=πck(a), is given by (4).
The solution to the leaders’ non-cooperative equilibrium searching problem depends on the information
levels of the MNO of the CSPs. Suppose that the leaders do not anticipate the MUs’ responses, then, we
obtain the NE of the game based on the best response of the players in the two levels, x∗ and a∗, for which,
• x∗ satisfies the condition given in (7).
• a∗ is the best response to x∗ and satisfies the following condition:
π
o(a∗0, a
∗
−0,x
∗) ≥ πo(a0, a
∗
−0,x
∗), ∀a0 ∈ A0,
πcj(a
∗
j , a
∗
−j,x
∗) ≥ πcj(aj, a
∗
−j ,x
∗), ∀j ∈ K\{0}, ∀aj ∈ Aj,
(10)
where a−i is the joint adversaries’ actions of player i (∀i∈K). Note that here we slightly abuse the
notations of πuj , π
o and πcj in (1), (4) and (6) by giving the corresponding parameters, respectively.
On the other hand, if the leaders are able to anticipate the optimistic optimal best response in the follower
sub-game, the SE solutions (i.e., the strong SE [20]), x∗ and a∗, satisfy the following inequalities:
 π
o(a∗0, a
∗
−0,x
∗(a∗)) ≥ πo(a0, a
∗
−0,x
∗(a0, a
∗
−0)), ∀a0 ∈ A0,
πcj(a
∗
j , a
∗
−j,x
∗(a∗)) ≥ πcj(aj , a
∗
−j,x
∗(aj , a
∗
−j)), ∀j ∈ K\{0}, ∀aj ∈ Aj,
(11)
where x∗(a) is drawn from the best-response mapping in (7) with respect to a. Further, when the inequalities
in (11) hold within an open neighbor area of a∗, Uǫ(a
∗) = {a : ‖(a − a∗)‖2 < ǫ}, for all a ∈Uǫ(a∗), we
say that (x∗, a∗(x∗)) is a local SE of the hierarchical game [21].
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EQUILIBRIA IN THE HIERARCHICAL GAME
A. Evolutionary Stable Strategies in the User-level Sub-game
Given the leaders’ strategy a, the MUs’ average payoff can be written from (1) and (7) as πu(x, a) =∑M
j=0 xjπ
u
j (x, a). By the pairwise proportional imitation protocol [22], the replicator dynamics yields the
following system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs), ∀j ∈M, which indicates that the subscription
growth rate of a CSP is in proportion to the subscription’s excess payoff:
dxj
dt
= vj(x, a) = xj(π
u
j (x, a)− π
u(x, a))
=xj
(
γ1,ju1(xjN)+γ2,ju2(xjN)−(1−θj)pu−
M∑
i=0
xi(γ1,iu1(xiN)+γ2,iu2(xiN)−(1−θi)pu)
)
,
(12)
where we omit t in xj(t) for simplicity. It is well-known by the folk theorem in the evolutionary game
theory that with the replicator dynamics, state x∗ is the ESS of the user sub-game Gf if x∗ is a stable rest
point of the ODEs [19]. Therefore, we are interested in identifying the stability property of the sub-game
Gf . By (1), when the leader strategy a is fixed, the payoff of MU state j, πuj (x, a) is only determined by
the population state xj . Then, we can verify that Gf is an evolutionary population potential game [22]:
Definition 3 (Potential Evolutionary Game). Consider a generalized evolutionary game G=〈N ,M,x, F (x)=
[Fj(x)]j∈M〉 with the vector of payoff function F (x) : Rn+ → R
n. G is a full potential game if there exists
a continuously differentiable function f(x) : Rn+ → R satisfying
∂f(x)
∂xj
= Fj(x), ∀j ∈M.
Lemma 1. Given any feasible joint leader action a, Gf is a population potential game.
Proof. By [22], Gf is a potential game if and only if it satisfies the property of full externality symmetry:
∂πuj (x, a)
∂xi
=
∂πui (x, a)
∂xj
, ∀i, j ∈M. (13)
From (1), we note that πuj (x, a) is only determined by the population state xj . Then, we can easily derive
∂πuj (x, a)
∂xi
=
∂πui (x, a)
∂xj
= 0, ∀j 6= i, (14)
which satisfies (13). Therefore Lemma 1 holds.
Lemma 2. Under the replicator dynamics given in (12), the population state x(t) always falls into the
M-simplex X from any x(0) ∈ X with a sum of changing rate
M∑
j=0
dxj(t)
dt
=
M∑
j=0
xj(t)(π
u
j (x(t), a)− π
u(x(t), a)) = 0. (15)
Proof. Let vj(x(t))=xj(t)
(
πuj (x(t), a)−π
u(x(t), a)
)
. From (12), we can omit a in πuj (x(t), a) and obtain
M∑
j=0
dx(t)
dt
=
M∑
j=0
vj(x(t))=
M∑
j=0
xj(t)
(
πuj (x(t))−π
u(x(t))
)
=
M∑
j=0
xj(t)π
u
j (x(t))− π
u(x(t)) = 0. (16)
From (16), we have
∑M
j=0 xj(t) =
∑M
j=0 xj(0). Since for xj(t) = 0 and xj(t) = 1,
dxj(t)
dt
= 0, we have
0≤xj(t)≤1. Therefore, x(t) always falls into the M-simplex.
For a general replicator dynamics-based system, a rest point of the dynamic function V = [vj(x(t))]
M
j=0
given by (12) may not necessarily be the ESS of the game [19]. Therefore, in order to obtain the ESS of
game Gf , we need to examine the stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics. Based on Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, we are able to obtain the following property regarding the stability of game Gf ’s equilibria:
Theorem 1. Every NE of Gf is evolutionarily stable in the interior of X
′ = X ∩ {x0 = 0}.
Proof. By Lemma 1, Gf is a population potential game. Then, by Definition 3, there exists a potential
function f(x) such that ∂f(x)
∂xj
= πuj (x), ∀j ∈ M. Note that π
u
j only depends on the local state xj . By
Proposition 3.1 in [22], for a potential population game, the set of NE states x∗ coincides with the solution
set of the following local maximization problem:
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
(
f(x) =
∑
j∈M
∫ xj
0
πuj (z, a)dz
)
. (17)
Then, for each local maximum solution x∗, we can find an ǫ > 0 such that f(x∗)≥f(x) for any x ∈ C =
Bǫ(x∗)∩X ′, where Bǫ(x∗) is the ǫ-ball centered at x∗. According to Definition 2.6 in [23], the asymptotically
stable state of the ODEs given in (12) is guaranteed to be an ESS. Thereby, we can design a Lyapunov
function L(x(t))=f(x∗)−f(x(t)) such that L(x(t)) ≥ 0, ∀x(t) ∈ C\{x∗} and L(x(t))=0 at x∗. Following
the Lyapunov Theorem [24], we have
dL(x(t))
dt
= −
(
∂f(x(t))
∂x(t)
)⊤
dx(t)
dt
, (18)
where ∂f(x(t))
∂x(t)
= [πu0 (x(t), a), . . . , π
u
M(x(t), a)]
⊤ and dx(t)
dt
= [v0(x(t), a), . . . , vM(x(t), a)]
⊤ (see also (12)).
If we omit x(t) and a in πj(x(t), a) for conciseness, then, expanding (18) leads to:
dL(x)
dt
= −
∑
j∈M
πuj vj = −
∑
j∈M
xjπ
u
j
(
πuj − π
u
)
(15)
= −
∑
j∈M
xjπ
u
j
(
πuj − π
u
)
− πu
∑
j∈M
xj(π
u
j − π
u)=−
∑
j∈M
xj((π
u
j )
2−(πu)2)=−Exj
{
(πuj − π
u)2
}
≤ 0.
(19)
By the definition of NE, we know that all the rest points in (12) violating the NE occur on the boundary
of X ′. This is because the extinct states do not revive, and hence the rest points at the boundary are
unstable [22]. By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) Theorem, for a stable point x∗ in the interior of X ′, we
have the following KKT system ∀j ∈M\{0} from the optimization problem in (17):
 π
u
j (x
∗
j , a) = µ
u − λuj ,
λujx
∗
j = 0, λ
u
j ≥ 0,
(20)
where µu is the Lagrange multiplier for the active constraint
∑
j∈M\{0} xj=1 and λ
u
j is the KKT multiplier
for the constraint xj≥0. Since ∀j 6= 0, xj 6=0 in the interior of X ′, then we have λuj =0 in (20). Therefore,
∀j 6= 0, πuj (x
∗
j , a) = µ
u and the solution of (20) is equivalent to the solution of Exj
{
(πuj − π
u)2
}
=0 (cf.
(19)). By applying Proposition 3.1 of [22] again, we know that the equality in (19) holds only when x=x∗,
so x∗ is either locally uniformly asymptotically stable (if x∗ is an isolated solution) or Lyapunov stable in
a locally asymptotically attractor area (if x∗ is in a connected set of solutions). Thereby, by Proposition 2.6
in [23], the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
Further, since ∀j ∈ M, πuj (x, a) is upper bounded, by the Weierstrass Theorem [25], there exists a
global maximum of f(x) on X ′. Suppose that this global maximum is achieved at xˆ∗. Following the same
technique of proving Theorem 1, we can find another Lyapunov function Lˆ(x(t)) = f(xˆ∗)−f(x(t)) such
that Lˆ(x(t))≥ 0, ∀x(t) ∈ X ′. Moreover, Lˆ(x(t)) = 0 only holds at the NE. By employing (19) again, we
know that Lˆ(x(t)) is strictly decreasing at the non-equilibrium points (excluding the boundary). Then, there
is no unstable equilibrium that attracts an evolutionary trajectory on the interior of X ′ (see Corollary 1).
Corollary 1. On the interior of X ′, the replicator dynamics in (12) always converges to an ESS.
From [18], we know that an evolutionary game is a stable game when it admits a concave potential
function. Namely, all the equilibrium states are globally neutrally stable and form a convex set. Therefore,
if the potential function of the follower sub-game f(x) is concave, the globally neutral stability of the
equilibrium states is ensured on the entire simplex X . Furthermore, the condition for game Gf ’s NE to
be unique (i.e., globally evolutionarily stable) can be obtained through the analysis of the maximization
problem in (17) based on the strict concavity of the potential function f(x):
Corollary 2. For the replicator dynamics in (12), a unique interior ESS exists if:
γj,1
du1(xjN)
dxj
+ γj,2
du2(xjN)
dxj
< 0, ∀j ∈M\{0}. (21)
Proof. According to our discussion in the proof of Theorem 1, the condition of a unique NE in the sub-
game Gf is equivalent to the condition of a unique solution to the problem give in (17) (cf. Proposition
3.1 in [22]). Therefore, we only need to check the condition for f(x) in (17) to be strictly concave. In the
interior of X ′, we only need to examine f(x) with respect to the non-zero population states x′ = [xj ]Mj=1.
Since πj(x, a) is determined only by the local state xj , and
∂f(x)
∂xj
=πuj (x), ∀j ∈M\{0}, it suffices to show
that the following diagonal Hessian matrix of f(x′),
∂2f(x′, a)
∂x′2
= Diag
(
dπ1(x, a)
dx1
, . . . ,
dπM (x, a)
dxM
)
, (22)
is negative definite. Then, it is sufficient to have ∀j ∈M\{0},
0 > γj,1
du1(xjN)
dxj
+ γj,2
du2(xjN)
dxj
. (23)
Then, by Theorem 1, Corollary 2 immediately holds.
Remark 1. With the realization of u1(xjN) and u2(xjN) in (2) and (3), respectively, from (21) we obtain
0 >
dπj(x
′, a)
dxj
=
γj,2N
1 +Nxj
−
γj,1N
oj +Nxj
. (24)
Namely, when γj,2(oj + Nxj) < γj,1(1 + Nxj), the follower sub-game with the utilities given by (2) and
(3) for the MUs and the CSPs admits a unique ESS. Intuitively, a service needs to first function properly
in order to survive in the intensively competing market. Then, under the assumption of utility realization in
(2) and (3), we can assume that the QoE sensitivity coefficient γj,1 is sufficiently larger than the network
effect sensitivity γj,2 due to the higher priority on the proper functioning of the services. In this case
4, the
MUs’ strategy evolution is able to converge to the unique ESS from any initial point.
B. Non-hierarchical Equilibrium in the Game
By Theorem 1, the equilibrium-searching problem of the replicator dynamics in (12) can be converted
into the constrained convex optimization problem described in (17). From Definition 1 and (10), the non-
hierarchical equilibrium, i.e., the NE of the game is obtained when all the players take their actions
simultaneously. If we treat the entire MU population as a super player with the joint state x being its
continuous strategy, by Theorem 1, the set of NE in the game will be equivalent to the set of NE in the
following auxiliary constrained game defined by (25)-(27):
• MUs’ subscription selection problem:
x∗ = argmax
x
(
f(x) =
∑
j∈M
∫ xj
0
πuj (z, a)dz
)
,
s.t.
∑
j∈M\{0}
xj = 1, ∀j∈M\{0} : xj ≥ 0.
(25)
• CSP j’s strategy selection problem (0≤j≤M):
a∗j =arg max
aj=(θj ,bj)
(
πcj(θj , bj) = u
CSP
j (xjN)−puθjxjN−pcbj
)
,
s.t. gj(xj , θj, bj , pu, pc) = puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
bj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1.
(26)
4Similar assumptions can be found in [26], where the congestion effect is modeled as the cost and rational MUs only select the services
with positive net payoffs.
• MNO’s price selection problem:
a∗0=arg max
a0=(pu,pb)
(
πo(pu, pb) = pc
M∑
j=1
bj + puN
M∑
j=1
xj
)
,
s.t. 0 ≤ pu ≤ pu, 0 ≤ pc ≤ pc.
(27)
From the constraints of the auxiliary game, we note that the strategy space of each player is jointly
determined by its adversaries’ strategies. Therefore, the equilibrium searching problem in the auxiliary
game becomes a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) problem [27]. This naturally leads to the idea of
applying the mathematical tool of Generalized Quasi-Variational Inequality (GQVI) [27] to examine the
property of the GNE. Before proceeding, we first provide the definition of the GQVI problem as follows:
Definition 4 (GQVI [27]). For a given set in a Euclidean space S ∈ Rn and a mapping F : S → Rn, the
GQVI problem denoted as VI(S, F ), is to find a pair of vector s∗∈S(s∗) and y∗∈F (s∗) such that:
(s− s∗)⊤y∗ ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S(s∗). (28)
Let Fl(x, a) =
[
−∇a0π
o(x, a),
(
−∇ajπ
c(x, a)
)
1≤j≤M
]⊤
define the mapping based on the gradients of
the objective functions in (26) and (27), and Ff (x, a)=
[
−πuj (x, a)
]⊤
j∈M
define the mapping based on the
gradients of the potential function f(x, a) in (25). Then, by concatenating the two mappings Fl(x, a) and
Ff (x, a), we introduce the following GQVI problem, which aims to find a pair of (x
∗, a∗) to satisfy the
GQVI condition given in Definition 4:
 x− x∗
a− a∗


⊤ 
 Ff(x∗, a∗)
Fl(x
∗, a∗)

 ≥ 0, ∀(x, a) ∈ C(x∗, a∗), (29)
where C(x, a) is defined by the following system of inequalities extracted from (25)-(27):

∀j∈M\{0} : gj(xj , θj , bj , pu, pc) = puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
∀j∈M\{0} : xj ≥ 0, bj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1,
0 ≤ pu ≤ pu, 0 ≤ pc ≤ pc,∑
j∈M xj = 1.
(30)
By the well-known solution-existence theorem of the GQVI problem (cf. Proposition 12.3 in [27]), the
set of GNE points in the auxiliary game, (x∗, a∗), is equivalent to the set of solutions to the GQVI problem
given by (29), if the local strategy space is compact and convex for any adversaries’ strategy, and the
objective function of each player is concave in the local strategy for any adversaries’ strategy. Then, to
ensure the existence of the GNE in the auxiliary game, it suffices to provide the conditions for (a) the GNE
problem defined by (25)-(27) to be equivalent to the GQVI problem given by (29), and (b) the solution
set of the GQVI problem to be non-empty. With this in mind, we can derive the following condition that
guarantees the existence of the NE in the game:
Theorem 2. Suppose that the potential function f(x, a) defined in (17) is concave with respect to x, namely,
γj,1
du1(xjN)
dxj
+ γj,2
du2(xjN)
dxj
≤ 0, ∀j∈M\{0}. Then, at least one NE exists in the hierarchical game.
Proof. It is straightforward that in the inequality constraint gj(xj, θj , bj , pu, pc) ≤ 0 for CSP j in (30),
the function gj(xj , θj, bj , pu, pc) is linear with respect to (θj , bj) for any (xj, pu, pc). Then, (30) defines
for each type of the players a compact, convex sub-space as Cx(a)=
{
x :
∑
j∈M xj=1, xj≥0, ∀j ∈M
}
,
Cj 6=0(x, a0)={(θj , bj) : bj≥0, 0≤θj ≤ 1, gj(θj , bj ; xj , pu, pc)≤0} and C0={(pu, pc) : 0≤pu≤pu, 0 ≤ pc ≤ pc},
respectively. Observing the objective functions in (26) and (27), we note that πcj(θj , bj) and π
o(pu, pb) are
both linear functions of their local strategies. Therefore, by Proposition 12.3 in [27], the set of the GNE
in the auxiliary game defined by (25)-(27) will be equivalent to the set of solutions to the GQVI problem
defined by (29), as long as the objective function in (25) is also a concave function of the MUs’ states x.
By applying the same method in the proof of Corollary 2, we can show that the property of concavity for
(25) holds with the inequality condition given by Theorem 2. Then, the equivalence between the solution
sets of the GNE and the GQVI problems is established.
Since the GNE in the auxiliary game is the same as the NE in the hierarchical game, it now suffices
to prove that the solution set of the GQVI problems is non-empty to ensure the existence of the NE in
the hierarchical game. By Proposition 12.7 in [27], the set of solution to the GQVI problem is non-empty
as long as the gradient-based mapping H(x, a) =
[
F⊤f (x
∗, a∗), F⊤l (x
∗, a∗)
]⊤
is continuous with respect to
the local strategies of each player. This condition immediately holds since πcj(x, a) and π
o(x, a) are both
first-order continuous and πuj (x, a) is piecewise continuous. Then, the proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
C. Hierarchical Equilibrium in the Game
In contrast to the NE based on simultaneous play, the derivation of the SE in (11) requires that the ESS of
the follower sub-game is drawn from a best reply-based point-to-set mapping from the leaders’ strategies.
Namely, the providers make their optimal decisions while knowing how the MUs will react to their market
strategies. Therefore, SE searching can be expressed in the form of a sequence of bi-level programming
problems of each CSP and the MNO, with the optimization problem given in (17) being the lower-level
equilibrium constraint for each of them [20]. Compared with (26), the solution to the best-response problem
of CSP j (∀j ∈ K\{0}) with the follower equilibrium constraint can be expressed as follows:
a∗j =arg max
aj=(θj ,bj)
(
uCSPj (xjN)−puθjxjN−pcbj
)
,
s.t. puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
x ∈ argmax
x
(∑
j∈M
∫ xj
0
πuj (z, a)dz
)
, s.t.
∑
j∈M\{0}
xj = 1.
(31)
For conciseness, in (31) the feasibility conditions of the parameters, i.e., xj ≥ 0, bj ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1,
0≤pu ≤ pu and 0≤pc ≤ pc, are not included in the constraints. Similarly, for the MNO, the best-response
problem with the same equilibrium constraint can be expressed by
a∗0=arg max
a0=(pu,pb)
(
pc
M∑
j=1
bj + puN
M∑
j=1
xj
)
,
s.t. ∀j∈M\{0} : puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
x ∈ argmax
x
(∑
j∈M
∫ xj
0
πuj (z, a)dz
)
, s.t.
∑
j∈M\{0}
xj = 1.
(32)
When the optimization problems given by (31) and (32) are solved jointly, the solution vector (x∗, a∗)
provides an optimistic, locally optimal solution in the sense of bi-level programming [20]. Again, by
considering the MU population as a super player with strategy x, SE searching in (31) and (32) can be
interpreted as a multi-leader-common-follower game. By the proof of Theorem 1, the set of follower sub-
game NE, namely, the ESS in the interior of X is equivalent to the set of solutions to the KKT systems
given in (20). Then, we can replace the lower-level optimization problem in the constraints of (31) and
(32) by the KKT conditions in (20) and obtain the equivalent Equilibrium Programming with Equilibrium
Constraints (EPEC) problem described jointly by (33) and (34) as follows:
(a∗j , x˜
∗)=arg max
(aj ,x˜)
(
πcj(xj , aj, a0) = u
CSP
j (xjN)−puθjxjN−pcbj
)
,
s.t. gj(xj , aj, a0) = puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
∀i∈M : hi(xi, ai, a0) = πui (xi, ai, a0)− µ
u + λui = 0,
∀i∈M : λui xi = 0, xi ≥ 0, λ
u
i ≥ 0,∑
i∈M xi = 1,
(33)
∀j∈K\{0} and
(a∗0, x˜
∗)=arg max
(a0,x˜)
(
πo(x, a) = pc
M∑
j=1
bj + puN
M∑
j=1
xj
)
,
s.t. ∀j∈M\{0} : , gj(xj , aj , a0) = puθjxjN + pcbj − cj ≤ 0,
∀j∈M : hj(xj , aj, a0) = πuj (xj , aj, a0)− µ
u + λuj = 0,
∀j∈M : λujxj = 0, xj ≥ 0, λ
u
j ≥ 0,∑
j∈M xj = 1,
(34)
where x˜∗ = (x∗, λu1 , . . . , λ
u
M , µ
u) is the combination of the MU population state and the multipliers that
constructs the Lagrangian function corresponding to the KKT conditions in (20) for the follower sub-game.
The EPEC problem defined by (33) and (34) is featured by the complementary slackness condition in
the constraints, which is introduced by the KKT condition of the follower sub-game. Alongside the non-
convexity introduced by the follower-level KKT conditions, it is also well-known that the classical KKT
theorem on the necessary optimality conditions is in jeopardy in the context of the above EPEC problem.
The reason lies in the presence of the complementary slackness conditions in the constraints, since with them
no standard constraint qualification is satisfied at any feasible (aj , x˜) in either (33) or (34) (cf., Theorem
5.11 in [20]). Thus, an alternative approach is needed for analyzing the SE in the considered game.
Following Scholtes’ regularization scheme [28] (cf. its generalization in [29]) for the Mathematical
Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), the index sets of the active constraints for a feasible
strategy (a, x˜) in the joint problem given by (33) and (34) can be defined as:

Ig(a, x˜) = {j|j ∈M\{0}, gj(a, x˜) = 0},
Ih(a, x˜) = {j|j ∈M, hj(a, x˜) = 0},
IG(a, x˜) = {j|j ∈M, xj = 0},
IH(a, x˜) = {j|j ∈M, λuj = 0}.
(35)
Let Gj(a, x˜) = xj , Hj(a, x˜) = λj and hˆ(a, x˜) =
∑
j∈M xj − 1. Then, the Jacobian matrix of the active
constraints can be derived based on (35) with the following gradients: ∇(a,x˜)gi(a, x˜) : i ∈ Ig(a, x˜),
∇(a,x˜)hj(a, x˜) : j ∈ Ih(a, x˜),∇(a,x˜)Gk(a, x˜) : k ∈ IG(a, x˜),∇(a,x˜)Hl(a, x˜) : l ∈ Ig(a, x˜) and∇(a,x˜)hˆ(a, x˜).
From (20) in the proof of Theorem 1, we note that λuj = 0 only if π
u
j (xj , a) 6= 0, namely, xj 6= 0 at the
parametric follower sub-game NE in the interior of X ′. Thus, we have {j : λuj = 0, xj = 0}= ∅, which
implies that the NE strategies of the follower game satisfy the strict complementary conditions. Therefore,
it is trivial to check that the aforementioned gradients are linearly independent when x˜ is the follower sub-
game NE. In other words, the Jacobian matrix of the active constraints has full row rank. Then, we know
that the MPEC Linear Independence Constraint Qualification (MPEC-LICQ, see [28] for the definition) is
satisfied by the optimization problem of each leader at any feasible point (a, x˜), given that x˜ corresponds
to the follower sub-game NE in the interior of X ′. Then, we have the following threorem.
Theorem 3. If (a∗,x∗) is a (possibly local) SE of the hierarchical game described jointly by (33) and (34),
then (a∗,x∗) is an EPEC (Nash) strongly stationary point (see also [28]).
Proof. Since we have shown that MPEC-LICQ is satisfied at each leader j’s local optimization problem
with equilibrium constraints (j = 0, 1, . . . ,M), Theorem 3 immediately follows theorem 4.2 in [29].
By Theorem 3, we are able to apply the classical KKT-based analysis to the hierarchical game again.
From (33) and (34), we introduce the Lagrangian function for each CSP j ∈ K as follows:
Lj(a,x,λ,µ)=


πcj(xj, aj , a0)−λ
c,1
j gj(aj , a0, xj)+λ
c,2
j xj+µ
c,1
j hj(xj , aj , a0)+µ
c,2
∑
j∈M
xj , if j 6=0,
πo(x, a)−
M∑
j=1
λ
o,1
j gj(aj, a0, xj)+
∑
j∈M
λ
o,2
j xj+
M∑
j=1
µ
o,1
j hj(xj , aj , a0)+µ
o,2
∑
j∈M
xj , if j=0,
(36)
where λ = (λc,λo) and µ = (µc,µo) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the inequality and equality
constraints of the leaders, respectively. Note that in (36), the complimentary condition-related constraints
on λuj can be ignored, since forcing any CSP j out of play (i.e., xj = 0 or π
u
j = 0) is obviously a dominated
strategy of the MNO. Then, based on (36) we obtain the concatenated KKT system from all the CSPs and
the MNO as follows: 

∀j∈K : ∇aLj(a,x,λ,µ) = 0,
∀j∈K : ∇xLj(a,x,λ,µ) = 0,∑
j∈M xj = 1,
∀j∈M : hj(xj , aj, a0) = 0,
∀j∈M\{0} : 0 ≥ gj(xj , aj , a0) ⊥ λ
c,1
j ≥ 0,
∀j∈M\{0} : 0 ≥ gj(xj , aj , a0) ⊥ λ
o,1
j ≥ 0,
∀j∈M\{0} : 0 ≤ xj ⊥ λ
c,2
j ≥ 0,
∀j∈M\{0} : 0 ≤ xj ⊥ λ
o,2
j ≥ 0,
(37)
where the operator ⊥ means component-wise orthogonality. Theorem 3 ensures that the solution to the
concatenated KKT system in (37), (a∗,x∗,λ∗,µ∗) provides a necessary optimal condition for the solution,
i.e., the SE, to the EPEC problem defined by (33) and (34).
Algorithm 1 Sequential strategy updating
Initialization: Randomly initialize the user population states as x(0)∈X and the leader strategies as a(0).
Output: x(t), a(t)
1: while the leader strategies a(t) do not converge, namely ‖a(t+ 1)− a(t)‖ ≥ ǫ do
2: for j = 0, . . . ,M do
3: Given the fixed adversary leader strategy a−j(t), solve the local MPEC problem defined by (33)
or (34) to obtain the solution (aj(t + 1), a−j(t),xj(t)), where xj(t) is the intermediate solution
for x given by provider j.
4: end for
5: x(t+ 1)← xM(t).
6: end while
The formulation of (37) inspires the diagonalization methods [29] for numerically approaching the SE of
the multi-leader-single-follower game. More specifically, we can separate the local nonlinear complimentary
problems for each leader in the form of KKT systems from (37). A sequential (i.e., cyclicly repeated)
procedure is performed in the manner of nonlinear Jacobi updating as in Algorithm 1. Especially, the
solution to the local MPEC problem in the inner loop of Algorithm 1 can be effectively obtained by
relaxing the complementary constraints in each MPEC, e.g., through the standard augmented Lagrangian
method [30]. However, by Theorem 4.3 of [29], if the sequence of solutions {(a(t),x(t))}t converges to a
point (a∗,x∗) for Algorithm 1, with the MPEC-LICQ condition, (a∗,x∗) is only guaranteed to be weakly
stationary but may not be a local SE5. To further inspect whether (a∗,x∗) is a (local) SE, we need to check
if (a∗,x∗) satisfies the Strong Sufficient Optimality Condition of second order (SSOC) based on (36):
Definition 5 (SSOC [20], [28]). For each local problem given by (33) or (34), the SSOC is satisfied at a
point (a,x), if there exist multipliers (λ,µ) for (37), such that for j ∈ K and every vector d 6= 0 with
∇(a,x)gj(a,x)d = 0, λ
c,1
j 6= 0,
∇(a,x)xjd = 0, λ
c,2
j 6= 0,
∇(a,x)hj(a,x)d = 0,
∇(a,x)
∑
i∈M xid = 0,


j 6= 0,
∇(a,x)gi(a,x)d = 0, ∀i ∈ {λ
o,1
i 6= 0},
∇(a,x)xid = 0, ∀i ∈ {λ
o,2
i 6= 0},
∇(a,x)hi(a,x)d = 0, ∀i ∈ K,
∇(a,x)
∑
i∈M xid = 0,


j = 0
the condition d⊤∇2(a,x)Lj(a,x)d > 0 holds.
5More precisely, (a∗,x∗) is a Bouligand stationary (B-stationary) point. See Definition 5.4 in [20] or Section 2.1 in [31] for more details.
By Theorem 4.1 in [28], if the SSOC is satisfied by (a∗,x∗) for each local MPEC problem defined by
(33) or (34), then Algorithm 1 converges to a local SE. With the logarithmic utility function for the MUs
as given in (2) and (3), we note that the value of ∇2(a,x)Lj(a,x) are only dependent of the multipliers µ
c,1
j
or µ
o,1
j . Therefore, it is possible for us to check the SSOC in a simple manner by exhaustively enumerating
the conditions of nonzero vectors d for a given (a∗,x∗) in each local MPEC.
V. DISTRIBUTED EQUILIBRIUM SEARCHING IN THE HIERARCHICAL GAME
A. Protocol Design for Distributed Equilibrium Searching
Although Algorithm 1 provides a sequential approach at the leader level for numerically calculating the
local SE, it is required that the ESS of the follower sub-game to be numerically solved in a centralized
manner at each inner iteration in the algorithm. As a result, it is still impractical to deploy such a protocol
in the real world. For this reason, in this subsection we aim to design a purely distributed equilibrium/stable
point searching protocol that is able to emulate the interaction among the MU with bounded rationality in
the real-world scenarios.
According to our analysis of the follower sub-game, the population evolution starting from the interior of
X will always reach an ESS. Without assuming any centralized coordinator for providing the information
about the payoff of subscribing to the other CSPs, we can describe in Algorithm 2 the strategy evolution
of the MUs following the pairwise proportional imitation protocol. It is worth noting that the protocol will
asymptotically lead to the replicator dynamics described by (12) as the population increases. Furthermore,
when the prices asked by the MNO and the states of the MU population are fixed, we note from the
constraints in (31) that the strategy space of the CSPs has a Cartesian product structure. Then, by Theorem 2,
we introduce the distributed projection-based method (cf., [32]) for the MNO’s and CSPs’ strategy searching
in Algorithm 3. The proposed Algorithms 2 and 3 jointly form an incentive-compatible protocol for
decentralized strategy updating in the considered content/service market. The convergence condition for
the strategy updating process in Algorithms 3 is provided in Theorem 4. Therefore, when imposing the
protocol onto the considered market, no party has incentive to deviate from following the proposed strategy
updating schemes without suffering from a revenue loss.
Lemma 3 (2.9.25 in [32]). Suppose that F (y) :D⊆Rn→Rn is continuously differentiable on the convex
set D. The following property (co-coercivity) holds if F is the gradient mapping of a convex function:
∃ξ > 0 : (y − y′)⊤ (F (y)− F (y′)) ≥ ξ‖F (y)− F (y′)‖2. (41)
Algorithm 2 Pairwise proportional imitation protocol for CSP selection
Initialization: Given the providers’ strategies a, each MU i (i∈N ) randomly subscribes to a CSP ji(0)∈M
Output: x(t)
1: while the evolutionary stable strategies are not reached do
2: for each MU n ∈ N do
3: Randomly select a new CSP j′n ∈M and determine the switching probability ρ(jn(t), j
′
n):
ρ(jn(t), j
′
n) = xj max
(
πuj′n(xj′n, a)− π
u
jn(t)(xjn(t), a), 0
)
(38)
4: if ρ(jn(t), j
′
n) > 0 then
5: jn(t+ 1)← j′n
6: end if
7: end for
8: t← t + 1 and update x(t + 1)
9: end while
Theorem 4. If the follower sub-game has a unique NE (i.e., the strict inequality condition given in (21)
holds), Algorithm 3 converges to an NE as long as the initial price strategies and population states satisfy
the feasible conditions given in (30), and the step size α is small enough.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 employs the property of a GQVI solution as well as Lemma 3 to show
that Algorithm 3 provides a contractive mapping of the strategies. See Appendix A for the details.
B. Impact of Social Delays in the Evolutionary Sub-game
Note that in Algorithm 2, it is implicitly assumed that an MU is able to immediately perceive the payoff
of a CSP subscription without any time delay. However, in a practical scenario, when switching to a new
CSP, the payoff information about the new subscription may present a certain fixed time delay τi. Such
time delay is unavoidable since it takes time for the MUs to evaluate their experience over the new social
network services. For the replicator dynamics approximated by Algorithm 2, it is also possible that the
MUs in population fraction j has to decide on switching to a new CSP i at time t according to the learned
“reputation” about service i, while the reputation propagation may experience a time delay of τi. This leads
to the formation of the following delayed replicator dynamics from (12) based on the pairwise proportional
Algorithm 3 Distributed provider strategy updating
Initialization: Randomly initialize the user population states as x(0)∈X and the leader strategies as a(0).
Output: x(t), a(t)
1: while the provider strategies a(t) do not converge do
2: Update the population state x(t+1) by Algorithm 2.
3: Update the CSPs and the MNO’s strategies as follows:
 aj(t+
1
2
)=aj(t)+α∇ajπ
o(x(t+1), a(t)), j=0,
aj(t+
1
2
)=aj(t)+α∇ajπ
c
j(x(t+1), a(t)), j 6=0,
(39)
where α > 0 is the updating step size and j ∈ K.
4: Denote y(t+ 1
2
) = (x(t+1), a(t+ 1
2
)). Project the averaged updating result of the strategies onto the
feasible set C(x(t + 1)):
y(t+1)=ΠC(x(t+1))
[
y(t)+ξ(y(t+ 1
2
)−y(t))
]
, (40)
where ΠC[·] is the projection operator onto the convex set C, and 0 < ξ < 1 is an averaging factor.
5: end while
imitation protocol (cf., Example VII.1 in [19]):
dxj(t)
dt
=vj(xj(t), (xi(t−τi))i∈M\{0},i 6=j , a)=xj(t)
∑
i∈M\{0},i 6=j
xi(t−τi)
(
πuj (xj(t), a)−π
u
i (xi(t−τi), a)
)
,
(42)
where we assume that the upper-level sub-game strategies are fixed as a. Note that the delay for the
population states may potentially be asymmetric due to the variation of (side) information propagation for
the service associated with different CSPs.
Since the stable rest points of the original ODE system in (12) may not be stable in the delayed replicator
dynamics given by (42), it is necessary to analyze the stability of the new Delayed Differential Equation
(DDE) system. We consider the perturbations xj(t) = x
∗
j + x˜j(t), where x
∗
j is a stable rest point of (12),
and obtain the linear variational system of (42) around x∗ as follows ∀j ∈M\{0}:
dx˜j(t)
dt
=
∑
i∈M\{0}
∂vj(x
∗, a)
∂xi
x˜i(t− τi) +
∂vj(x
∗, a)
∂xj
x˜j(t). (43)
We first consider that the information delay is uniform for all the services. From (43), we have:
dx˜j(t)
dt
= A0x˜(t) + A1x˜(t− τ)
=


∂v1(x∗,a)
∂x1
0 . . . 0
0 ∂v2(x
∗,a)
∂x2
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ∂vM (x
∗,a)
∂xM


x˜(t) +


0 ∂v1(x
∗,a)
∂x2
. . .
∂v1(x∗,a)
∂xM
∂v2(x∗,a)
∂x1
0 . . . ∂v2(x
∗,a)
∂xM
...
...
. . .
...
∂vM (x
∗,a)
∂x1
∂vM (x
∗,a)
∂x2
. . . 0


x˜(t− τ).
(44)
It is known from the Hartman-Grobman Theorem that if the trivial solution of the linear system in (43) is
(locally) asymptotically stable, then the asymptotically stable rest point of the original replicator dynamics
x∗ in (12) is also asymptotically stable for the delayed replicator dynamics in (42) and therefore delay-
independent. since A0 + A1 is equivalent to the Jacobian of the delay-free replicator dynamics in (12) at
x∗, we have the following proposition from [33]:
Proposition 1. For all sufficiently small uniform information delay τ , the asymptotically stable states in
the original replicator dynamics in (12) is still asymptotically stable in the delayed system in (42).
From (44), we can extend to the case of asymmetric delays and obtain the following delayed dynamics:
dx˜j(t)
dt
= A0x˜(t) +
M∑
j=1
Ajx˜(t− τj), (45)
where A0 is given by (44) and ∀j 6= 0, ∀i 6= j, Aj(i, j) =
∂vi(x
∗,a)
∂xj
, otherwise Aj(i, k) = 0, ∀i, k 6= j.
We note that
∑M
j=1Aj in (45) is equal to A1 in (44). Therefore, it is straightforward that Proposition 1
also holds for (45). Further, based on (45) we now are able to investigate the stability of the DDEs with
asymmetric non-small delays. By Proposition 7.1 in [33], we know that if the linearized system with fixed
asymmetric non-small delays is stable, a Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional exists in the following form:
L(t) = φ(0)⊤Pφ(0) +
M∑
j=1
∫ 0
hj
φ(ǫ)⊤Rjφ(ǫ)dǫ, (46)
where φ(t)⊤ =
[
x˜⊤(t) x˜⊤(t− τ1) . . . x˜⊤(t− τM)
]
, and P and Rj are symmetric and positive semi-
definite. Since (45) is in the form of a typical retarded system, by Proposition 7.1 in [33], it would be
asymptotically stable if the following matrix inequality (i.e., the matrix being negative definite) holds:
Φ =


A⊤0 P+PA
0 +
∑M
j=1Rj PA1 PA2 . . . PAM
A⊤1 P −R1 0 . . . 0
A⊤2 P 0 −R2 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
A⊤MP 0 0 . . . −RM


<0. (47)
Again, if the population fractions all experience uniform information delay as in (44), the inequality
condition in (47) is reduced to the following:
Φ =

A⊤0 P+PA0 +R1 PA1
A⊤1 P −R1

 <0. (48)
Let Q = P−1. By symmetric block matrix determinant calculation, (48) is equivalent to
QA⊤0 + A0Q+QR
−1
1 Q+ A1R
−1
1 A
⊤
1 < 0. (49)
Due to the requirement that R1 and P are symmetric positive definite, we known that in (49), QR
−1
1 Q +
A1R
−1
1 A
⊤
1 is also positive definite. Therefore, it requires that A0 is strictly negative definite. In general, the
delayed replicator dynamic system is not always delay-invariant. However, we can simplify the situation
by letting P = I and R = ωI , where I is the identity matrix, and obtain the following sufficient condition
for the follower evolutionary game to be delay-independent:
Proposition 2. Denote the eigenvalues of A0 +A1 by λi(A0 +A1). For a uniform deterministic delay, the
asymptotic stability of the equilibria of the follower sub-game in (12) is preserved in the delayed dynamics
in (42), if we can find a scalar ω satisfying the following condition for each λi(A0 + A1):
∂vi(x
∗, a)
∂xi
+ ω +
1
ω
(
λi(A0 + A1)−
∂vi(x
∗, a)
∂xi
)2
< 0. (50)
Proof. With the assumption of P = I and R = ωI , (49) is reduced to 2A0 + ωI + ω
−1(A1A
⊤
1 ) < 0.
Let vi denote the eigenvector associated with λi(A0 + A1). Then, we have (A0 + A1)vi − A0(i, i)Ivi =
λi(A0 + A1)vi −A0(i, i)vi, which leads to (50).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
For ease of exposition, in this section we adopt the logarithmic realization of the utility functions for the
MUs and the CSPs given in (2), (3) and (5) for performing the numerical simulations.
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Fig. 3. (a) A snapshot of the user state evolution at the inner loop of Algorithm 3 (i.e., Algorithm 2). (b) The evolution of user states at the
outer loop of Algorithm 3. (c) The evolution of sponsorship levels (θj ) offered by the CSPs. (d) The evolution of subscription price pu.
A. Convergence of the Proposed Algorithm and Stability of the Evolutionary Sub-game
We first demonstrate the evolution of the MU population states and the providers’ strategies with
Algorithm 3 in Figure 3. For the purpose of visualization, we use a case of 3 CSPs to show the convergence
property of the proposed strategy searching scheme. We choose the simulation parameters as N = 8000,
o1=2, o2=5, o3=4, cj=10
4, γ1=1.7 and γ2=1.1. To ensure that the MUs experience approximately the
same level of utility, πuj , we set the initial delivery bandwidth reserved by each CSP to be b1(0)=1.4MHz,
b2(0) = 2MHz, b3(0) = 1.5MHz. The selected parameter set satisfies the condition in (21) and creates a
market of heterogeneous CSPs with discernible and imperfectly substitutable services.
Figure 3(a) shows a single round evolution of the MU population states in the follower sub-game
(Algorithm 2). Figure 3(b) demonstrates the convergence tendency of the MU population states in the
outer loop of Algorithm 3. From Figures 3(d) and 3(c), we can observe that it takes about 10 iterations
for the MNO to reach its equilibrium prices and it takes longer time (roughly 20 iterations) for the CSP to
determine their equilibrium strategies. Figures 3(c) and 3(d) provide important insight into the projection-
based searching scheme in Algorithm 3. Theoretically, the joint strategy-projection mechanism in (40)
prevents the gradient-based mechanism in (39) to linearly increase the bandwidth price asked by the MNO
and the sponsorship level offered by the CSPs. Figure 3(d) indicates that the MNO may experience short-
term oscillation in determining the subscription prices. The strategy evolution in Figures 3(c) and 3(d)
matches well with our theoretical finding. Moreover, Figure 3(c) indicates that the CSP with a lower initial
delivery bandwidth bj(0) tends to take more advantage of the global network effect to improve its profit.
In order to compensate for the disadvantage in QoE due to a smaller bj(0) and attract users, The CSP will
attempt to offer a higher level of sponsorship. Figure 3(b) indicates that although the CSPs providing a
lower basic bandwidth (i.e., CSP 1 and CSP 3) are not able to increase their user utility to the same level
as CSP 2 does due to the sponsoring cost, they do succeed in attracting more users by increasing their
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Fig. 4. A snapshot of the MU state evolution at the inner loop of Algorithm 3 with different uniform delays τ . (a) τ = 0.1. (b) τ = 1. (c)
τ = 10. (d) τ = 50.
sponsorship levels. In comparison, thanks to a higher internal network effect, CSP 2 mainly relies on its
better QoE among the CSPs to attract subscribers and does not need to offer a high level of subsidy.
In Figure 4, we present the population state evolution with fixed provider strategy and uniform information
delays for the same system setup. As can be observed in Figure 4(a), with small delays (τ = 0.1), the MU
population will converge to the same evolutionary stable states as in Figure 3(a) via a different trajectory.
Such a result provides the exact evidence of Proposition 1. However, as we increase the value of delay, we
can observe in Figures 4(b)-4(d) that the evolutionary stable states will shift to a different position as we
gradually increase the value of delay. Such a finding indicates that the evolutionary sub-game of the MUs
is not delay-independent. However, in the studied cases there still exists a globally evolutionary stable state
for the delayed replicator dynamics.
B. Impact of Provider Strategies on the Utilities of Market Participants
We provide further analysis about the impact of the sponsorship levels and MNO’s prices on the MUs’ and
the CSP’s utilities. Again, for the purpose of visualization, we first consider a market of two symmetric CSPs
with a fixed MNO pricing strategy. We assume that there are 50000 MUs, and set the market parameters
as pu=0.3, pc=0, σj = 10
5, γ1=0.1, γ2=0.05 and a fixed bj =10MHz. From Figures 5(a) and 5(b), we
can observe that when the CSPs provide identical services, the performance of the two MUs are symmetric
with respect to the sponsorship levels of the two CSPs. In Figure 5(c), we note that when fixing one CSP’s
sponsorship level, increasing the other CSP’s sponsorship level will always increase the equilibrium payoff
of the corresponding MU population fraction. Consequently, this will lead to a higher probability for the
MUs to subscribe to the CSP (see Figure 5(d)). However, as we can observe in Figure 5(e), with the other
CSP’s sponsorship level is fixed, the CSP’s payoff will first increase and then decrease as its sponsorship
level is increased. This indicates that, when the subscription price asked by the MNO, pu, is relatively
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Fig. 5. (a) MU’s payoff for choosing CSP 1 at the NE with respect to (θ1, θ2). (b) MU’s payoff for choosing CSP 2 at the NE with respect
to (θ1, θ2). (c) MU’s payoff for choosing CSP 1 at the NE with respect to flexible sponsorship levels (θ1) of CSP 1 and fixed sponsorship
levels (θ2) of CSP 2. (d) Probability of the MUs subscribing to CSP 1 at the NE with respect to flexible sponsorship levels of CSP 1 and
fixed sponsorship levels of CSP 2. (e) Payoff of CSP 1 with respect to its sponsorship levels at different levels of θ2.
small, the revenue earned through attracting more subscribers is able to compensate the payment made to
the MNO. Therefore, we can predict that in the condition of a relatively large σj and small pu for the
CSPs, the provider-level sub-game equilibrium is reached around θj = 1. As the value of pu increases, the
CSPs will gradually stop sponsoring the MUs. When the value of pu is very large, sub-game equilibrium
is reached around θj = 0.
To verify our prediction, we examine the impact of the MNO’s pricing strategies on both the payoffs of
the MUs and CSPs. To better illustrate the impact of the MNO’s subscription price pu on the strategies and
payoff levels of the MUs and the CSPs, we assume that the MUs are unable to refrain from playing the
game and remove the strategy m=0 from M in the follower sub-game. The total demand of the services
is also fixed. As shown in Figure 6(a), when the subscription price pu asked by the MNO is low, the CSPs
tend to offer full subsidies to the MUs since they will gain more from the increasing number of subscribers.
As a result, the competition between the (homogeneous) CSPs become destructive and result in a prisoner’s
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Fig. 6. (a) Sponsorship levels at the equilibrium versus different fixed subscription prices pu. (b) MU’s payoff at the equilibrium versus
different fixed subscription prices pu. (c) CSP’s payoff at the equilibrium versus different fixed subscription prices pu.
dilemma-like situation (see the plateau part in Figure 6(a) and the corresponding part in Figure 6(c)). On
the other hand, the “arm-racing” between the CSPs will benefit the MUs since the increased sponsorship
will compensate for the increasing subscription cost (see Figure 6(b)). However, as the subscribing price
pu keeps increasing, the revenue received by the CSPs will finally be unable to cover the cost of attracting
subscribers. Then, the CSPs will gradually reduce the sponsorship offered to the MUs. Since the MUs are
forced to subscribe to one of the two CSPs, the MUs will eventually suffer from negative payoff. The CSPs
will still enjoy a positive revenue at the equilibrium by finally stop offering any subsidies (see Figure 6(c))).
C. Impact of Network Effects
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the global network effects on the performance of the MUs
and the CSPs at the equilibrium. We assume a market of three homogeneous CSPs and set the simulation
parameters as bj =2MHz, oj =1, cj =10
4, γ1=2.5 and σj =20. We also set the range of MNO prices by
0≤pu≤20 and 0≤pc≤200. In addition to the equilibrium obtained through Algorithm 3, we also examine
the player performance in the following cases:
• SE: the strategies are updated following the Gauss-Seidel updating scheme described in Algorithm 1.
• NE: all the players update their strategy in the distributed manner given by Algorithm 3.
• The myopic strategies: at each round, the MNO and the CSPs search for their best-response with
respect to the MU population states.
As can be observed in Figure 7, myopically updating the strategies through best-response search will finally
enforce all the MUs to subscribe to no service. Therefore, both the MUs and the CSPs receive zero payoff.
At the SE, the leaders’ performance are significantly better than that at the NE, and such an improvement
is at the loss of MUs. In the mean time, due to the existence of the global network effect, when the number
✵ ✷ ✹ ✻ ✽ ✶✵
◆ ✁✂✄☎ ✆✝ ✞✟✠
✶✵
✺
✵
✡
✶✵
✶✡
✷✵
✷✡
❆
☛
☞
✌
✍
✎
☞
✏
✍
✑
✒
✓
✓
✒
✓
✔
✕
✖
❙✗
✘✗
▼✙✚✛✜✢
(a)
✵ ✷ ✹ ✻ ✽ ✶✵
◆ ✁✂✄☎ ✆✝ ✞✟✠
✶✵
✺
✵
✶✵✵✵
✷✵✵✵
✸✵✵✵
✹✵✵✵
❙
✡
☛
☞
✌
✍
❙
✎
✎
✏
✑
☞
✌
✌
✒
✓✔
✕✔
▼✖✗✘✙✚
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) Average MU payoff at the equilibrium versus number of MUs. (b) Average CSP payoff at the equilibrium versus number of MUs.
of MUs increases, the worsen congestion effect among the MUs is compensated by the increasing network
effect. The performance of the MUs at both the SE and the NE remains almost unchanged.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the structure of a sponsored content/service market in mobile networks,
which is featured by the global network effect in the perceived utility of a large population of users
and the existence of multiple content/service providers. We have proposed a hierarchical game-based
framework to model the interactions among the three parties in the market, namely, the mobile network
operator, the content/service providers and the mobile users. By exploiting the structure of the proposed
hierarchical game, we have modeled the user-level sub-game as an evolutionary game and the interaction
among the content/service provider and the mobile network operator as a non-cooperative equilibrium
searching problem. We have discovered a few important properties regarding the equilibria of the game
and its existence condition. Based on our discoveries, we have designed a distributed, iterative scheme
for equilibrium searching. Both the theoretical analysis and numerical simulation results have shown the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The simulation results have provided important insight into the
formation of the market equilibrium as well as the impact of sponsorship levels on the payoffs of both the
mobile users and the service providers.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Consider a fixed feasible provider strategies a. If the concavity condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied, the
replicator dynamics described by Algorithm 2 ensures the convergence to a solution of the GQVI problem
given in (7): (x − x′)⊤Ff(x
′, a) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Cx(x
′, a). The concavity condition in Theorem 2 also ensures
the existence of a non-empty set of solutions to the GQVI problem given by (29). We denote the joint
strategies across the two levels by y=[x⊤, a⊤]⊤ and the gradient-based mapping for the joint strategies by
H(x, a) = [F⊤l (x, a), F
⊤
f (x, a)]
⊤. Now the lower-level potential function f(x, a) defined in (17) is concave
with respect to x over the simplex X , and πcj(x, a) and π
o(x, a) are linear with respect to the local strategies
aj on a compact convex set Caj (x). Then, the equivalent GQVI problem for the Stackelberg solution in
(29) can be rewritten in the following form:
(y − y∗)⊤H(y∗) ≥ 0, ∀y=[x⊤, a⊤]⊤ ∈ C(x∗, a∗). (51)
In the inner loop of Algorithm 3, the result of Algorithm 2, x(t + 1), is the solutions to (7) given the
upper-level strategy a(t) at time t. Let {y1(t) = (x(t), a(t))} and {y2(t) = (z(t),b(t))} be two sequences
generated by Algorithm 3 from different initial strategies. Since x(t+ 1) and z(t+ 1) are the equilibrium
states in the follower sub-game given a(t) and b(t), respectively, by (7), we have the following inequality:
0≤(x(t + 1)− z(t+ 1))⊤Ff (z(t+ 1),b(t)) + (z(t+ 1)− x(t+ 1))
⊤Ff (x(t+ 1), a(t))
=(x(t+1)−z(t+1))⊤
(
Ff(z(t+1),b(t))−Ff(x(t+1), a(t))
)
.
(52)
By the non-expansive property of the projection operation over a convex sub-space [32], we can obtain the
following inequality by applying Algorithm 3 when ignoring the strategy averaging process in (40),
‖y1(t+1)−y2(t+1)‖2 =
∥∥ΠC(y1(t+ 12))−ΠC(y2(t+ 12))∥∥2
≤
∥∥y1(t+ 1
2
)−y2(t+ 1
2
)
∥∥2 = ‖x(t + 1)− z(t + 1)‖2 + ∥∥a(t + 1
2
)− b(t+ 1
2
)
∥∥2 . (53)
Regarding the second term on the right-hand side in (53), the following inequality holds,
‖a(t+ 1
2
)−b(t+ 1
2
)‖2 = ‖a(t)−αFl(x(t+1), a(t))−(b(t)−αFl(z(t+1),b(t))‖
2
≤‖a(t)−b(t)−α(Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t)))‖
2
=‖a(t)−b(t)‖2+α2 ‖Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))‖
2
−2α (a(t)−b(t))⊤
(
Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))
)
.
(54)
After multiplying (52) by 2α and adding it up with (54), we obtain
‖a(t+ 1
2
)−b(t+ 1
2
)‖2 ≤‖a(t)−b(t)‖2+α2‖Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))‖2
−2α
(
[x⊤(t+1), a⊤(t)]⊤−[z⊤(t+1),b⊤(t)]⊤
)⊤
(H(x(t+1), a(t))−H(z(t+1),b(t))) .
(55)
Since the potential function of the lower-level sub-game f(x, a) is concave, the gradient-based mapping
Ff (x, a) is monotone and continuously differentiable in x. Similarly, the gradient mapping obtained from the
linear objective function from the provider level, Fl(x, a), is also monotone and continuously differentiable.
By (41), there exists a positive parameter ξ such that the following holds ∀y,y′:
(y− y′)⊤ (H(y)−H(y′)) ≥ ξ‖H(y)−H(y′)‖2. (56)
Then, from (55) and (56) we obtain
‖a(t+ 1
2
)−b(t+ 1
2
)‖2
≤‖a(t)−b(t)‖2+α2‖Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))‖2 −2αξ ‖H(x(t+1), a(t))−H(z(t+1),b(t))‖
2
≤ ‖a(t)−b(t)‖2− (2αξ − α2)‖Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))‖2
−2αξ ‖Ff(x(t+1), a(t))−Ff(z(t+1),b(t))‖
2
.
(57)
Therefore, as long as α is sufficiently small (i.e., 0<α≤2ξ), and the values of x(t+1) obtained from the
inner-loop is the equilibrium of the lower-level sub-game given a(t), Algorithm 3 provides a non-expansive
mapping for the sequence {a(t)}. Then, after applying the averaging scheme, Algorithm 3 guarantees the
convergence of a(t): lim
t→∞
‖a(t)−b(t)‖=0 (cf., [27]). With a converging sequence of a(t), the following
holds when the user-level sub-game has a unique NE,
‖x(t+1)−z(t+1)‖ ≤ ‖x(t)−z(t)‖ . (58)
Plugging (57) and (58) into (53), we obtain
‖y1(t+1)−y2(t+1)‖2 ≤ ‖y1(t)−(y2(t))‖
2
−(2αξ − α2)‖Fl(x(t+1), a(t))−Fl(z(t+1),b(t))‖2 −2αξ ‖Fh(x(t+1), a(t))−Fh(z(t+1),b(t))‖
2
.
(59)
Therefore, Algorithm 3 provides a non-expansive mapping of the joint strategies. With the perturbation
introduced by an averaging process, it is known that a non-expansive mapping guarantees the convergence
to the solution of the GQVI [27]. Then, the proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
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